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COMMENTS
which is a pertinent issue in a felony charge against defendant,
and concluded that the defendant's right against self-incrimi-
nation had not been violated.
In a recent leading case, a stomach pump was used on defen-
dant to cause him to spit up two capsules of previously swallowed
morphine. This evidence was introduced, and, as a result, the de-
fendant was convicted of possessing narcotics. The California
District Court of Appeal decision16 was consistent with the prin-
cipal case in holding that evidence improperly obtained could be
introduced on the ground that illegality of search does not affect
admissibility of evidence. On certiorari, however, the United
States Supreme Court held that this forced extraction was a vio-
lation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution in that it constituted a coerced con-
fessionY.1 This was not treated by the Court as either an in-
stance of unreasonable search and seizure or of self-incrimina-
tion, since the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not apply to
state action.'8 The ruling indicates, however, that due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment may be invoked to inhibit
state action similar to, although more extreme than, that of the
principal case.
The prevailing view, expressed in the principal case, may lead
to unexpected results. In the present zeal for the clean-up of
crime, powers which may boomerang have been allowed law en-
forcement agencies. Although the stricter view may in some in-
stances protect the guilty, such an occasional result would appear
to be a mere incidental by-product of a sounder procedure which
eventually would force the prosecutor to obtain evidence from
other sources.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF RELIGION-PARENTS'
DUTY TO PROVIDE MEDICAL ATTENTION
Parents of an infant child suffering from a serious blood con-
dition refused, on religious grounds, to consent to a blood trans-
fusion. Pursuant to a statute authorizing the appointment of a
guardian for neglected childen, an order was sought for appoint-
16. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 225 P.2d 1 (1950), reheaming
denied (by the California Supreme Court), id. at 143, 225 P.2d at 9913(1951).
17. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
18. Ibid.
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ment of a guardian who would consent to a blood transfusion.
The trial court entered the order. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Illinois, held: affirmed. A child whose parents refused to
permit a blood transfusion, when lack of the transfusion meant
that the child would almost certainly die or at best be mentally
impaired for life, was a "neglected child" within the meaning of
the statutory definition and a religious belief does not constitute
a defense for the breach of a statutory duty.2
Religious liberty and freedom of worship are protected by the
constitutions of the various states3 and the United States.4 While
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution refers only to
federal action, it is now well settled that the prohibitions imposed
upon Congress by that Amendment have also been imposed by
the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibitions against state action.cI
However, statutes which are designed to promote and protect the
peace, health, and welfare of society have been held to be consti-
tutional and within the police power even though such statutes
may indirectly infringe upon the freedom of religious actions.0
The Courts in deciding such cases have distinguished between
the absolute freedom to believe and the freedom to follow by ac-
tions the dictates of one's conscience7
The holding of the principal case illustrates another instance
where religious action predicated upon a religious tenet has been
indirectly invaded. A case directly in point and reaching the
same result is Mitchell v. Davis.? The greater number of deci-
sions have arisen, however, on manslaughter proceedings where
a sick child, who was incapable of judging for himself, has died
because his parents, on religious grounds, had failed to procure
1. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 23, §§ 190-220 (1949).
2. People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1951).
3. E.g., ILL. CONST. Art. i, § 3; Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 5; N.Y. CONST.
Art. I, § 3.
4. U.S. CONsT. AmEND. I.
5. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
6. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. U.S., 98
U.S. 145 (1879).
7. People v. Donner, 199 Misc. 643 (1950) (this case also appears as
Shapiro v. Dorin, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830); Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct. of City
of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.2d 460, 171 P.2d 8 (1946).
8. 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
9. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Regina v.
Downes, 1 Q.B.D. 25, 13 Cox C.C. 111 (1875); see Note, 12 A.L.R.2d 1050
(1947); Note, 10 A.L.R. 1138 (1920).
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medical attention. There is doubt as to what the correct common
law rule was in such a case,10 but, following statutory enact-
ments establishing the duty of a parent to furnish medical and
dental attention for infant children," it has been almost univer-
sally held that a religious belief offers no defense for failure to
provide such attention.12
In arriving at their decisions, the courts have given careful
attention to the following factors: (1) whether the legislature
or a judicial decision has imposed the duty upon the parents to
provide medical attention for their infant children; (2) whether
it has been found as a matter of fact that the parent breached
such duty; (3) whether such neglect has resulted in death or if
continued would result in the death, acceleration of death, or
gross physical or mental impairment of the infant; (4) whether
there were conflicting theories of medical diagnosis, prognosis,
and method of treatment employed by recognized schools of med-
ical science; (5) whether such medical procedures as were
deemed necessary would involve substantial risk of life, and (6)
whether the benefit which would accrue to the child in ordering
a temporary separation and treatment'" would outweigh the
social benefit that would result if the child remained with its
parents.'
Where the defense of a religious and conscientious belief is
raised, the problem is essentially one of reaching a balance be-
tween the rights of parents and the state's valid exercise of its
10. Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C.C. 530 (1868). But cf. Regina v.
Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283; Regina v. Hines, 80 Sess. Pap. C.C.C. 309 (1874)
(cited in Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox C.C. 111, 114 n.a. (1875) and Regina v.
Senior, supra) ; Regina v. Hurry, 76 Sess. Pap. C.C.C. 63 (1872) (cited in
Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox C.C. 111, 113 n.a. (1875) and Regina v. Senior,
supra).
11. For a history of English statutory enactments, see Regina v. Senior,
[1899] 1 Q.B. 283.
12. Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. Rep. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911); People
v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Rex v. Brooks, 9 B.C. 13,
5 Can. Cr. Cas. 372 (1902); Regina v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 Contra:
Regina v. Felton, 33 L.J.N.C. 563 (1898); cf. Justice v. State, 116 Ga. 605,
42 S.E. 1013 (1902).
13. It should be noted that the separation from the parents resulting
from guardianship, in these cases, is of temporary nature. Mitchell v.
Davis, 205 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
14. Although reaching opposite, but distinguishable, results from that
of the principal case, the courts in the following cases have presented
detailed analysis of the problems involved in such situations: In re Hudson,
13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); Justice v. State, 116 Ga. 605, 42
S.E. 1013 (1902); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 561 (1912).
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police power for the protection of the health and welfare of soci-
ety. In reaching such a balance, any reasonable doubt on the part
of the court or the jury as to the efficacy of the treatment and
prognosis, the urgency and necessity of such treatment, and the
resultant social and moral advancement, should be resolved
in favor of the parent's fredom of action. The area where courts
intervene should always be limited by extremely narrow bounds
which can only be extended as the science of medicine and
surgery becomes more definite and exact.
CRImINAL LAw-PoWER OF A COURT TO TRY A PERSON
BROUGHT INTO THE JURISDICTION ILLEGALLY
While residing in Illinois, petitioner was seized by Michigan
police, taken into Michigan, tried and convicted of a murder com-
mitted in Michigan. Extradition proceedings were not availed
of. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court, alleging that he had been brought into the
jurisdiction in violation of the Federal Anti-Kidnapping Statute.,
The petition was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
decision of the District Court was reversed and remanded. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held: re-
versed, and the decision of the District Court reinstated on the
ground that the power of a court to try and convict a person
accused of a crime is not impaired by the fact that he has been
forcibly brought into the jurisdiction.2
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States was
consistent with its own precedents. In Ker v. Illinois,3 where a
state official had forcibly brought the accused back from a
foreign country without having first requested the foreign coun-
try to return him, it was held that the state court had jurisdic-
tion to try and convict the accused. Later, in Mahon v. Justice, 4
the same court ruled that the forcible abduction of a person ac-
cused of a crime from a sister state by police officers of the prose-
cuting state did not render the conviction void. The rule of those
two cases has been consistently followed by both federal and
state tribunals in cases involving the trial of persons abducted
1. 62 STAT. 760 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1950).
2. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
3. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
4. 127 U.S. 700 (1888).
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